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WHY LEGALIZED INSIDER TRADING WOULD BE A DISASTER
BY GEORGE W. DENT, JR.*
ABSTRACT
Although insider trading is illegal, a stubborn minority still
defends it as an efficient means of compensating executives and spurring
innovation. However, this minority assumes that legal insider trading
would be constrained by the personal wealth of the insiders so that the
scope of insider trading would rarely or never be so large as to cause
outsiders to stop trading in affected stocks. This Note argues that there
would be no such constraint because insiders could obtain outside
financing to fully exploit their informational advantage. Outsiders would
flee the public stock markets, which would drastically shrink or
disappear. The prospect of huge trading profits would induce managers
to change many decisions, often to the detriment of the firm, in ways that
would be virtually impossible for corporate monitors to detect.
Accordingly, the case of legalizing insider trading is insupportable.
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Although insider trading is illegal and widely condemned, a
stubborn minority still defends it as an efficient method of compensating
executives and spurring innovation.1 However, these defenses crucially
assume that the wealth of individual insiders constrains the scope of
insider trading.2 Accordingly, this minority argues that the abnormal
profits realized by inside traders, at the expense of outsiders, are rarely or
never large enough to cause outsiders to flee the affected stock.3
Similarly, the potential gains from insider trading are rarely, if ever, big
enough to corrupt the managers' business conduct.4 Thus, insider trading
generates benefits for stockholders that exceed its immediate losses.5
This Note opines that, if insider trading were allowed, it would not
be constrained by insiders' wealth, because insiders could obtain enough
outside financing to fully exploit their informational advantage. In so
doing, insiders would inevitably "muscle out" public investors.6 Stock
markets would drastically shrink, if not disappear.7 The prospect of huge
trading profits would tempt managers to alter many decisions, causing
damage to the firm in ways that would be virtually impossible for
corporate monitors to detect.8
The resulting damage to public
shareholders would far exceed any benefits from insider trading.9
Accordingly, the case for insider trading is insupportable.10

1
A number of state courts continue to hold that insider trading breaches no
fiduciary duty. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 572 n.58
(2002); see also HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 172-73, 178
(1966) (categorizing the perceived danger posed by insider trading as generally exaggerated
and noting how businesses may actually benefit from the use of inside information by
government officials); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 860 (1983) (arguing that insider trading is, in many markets,
irregularly enforced, and that the law, in promoting enforcement, ignores the economic
realities of insider trading); Darren T. Roulstone, The Relation Between Insider-Trading
Restrictions and Executive Compensation, 41 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 525, 549 (2003) ("[I]nsider
trading rewards and motivates executives.").
2
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 591 ("[T]he insider's compensation is limited by
the number of shares he can purchase. This, in turn, is limited by his wealth."); see also
MANNE, supra note 1, at 173 (discussing the parameters of inside information usage by
government employees).
3
See infra Part II (describing how insider trading, due to the fact that it is illegal, does
not involve utilization of loaned funds).
4
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 873-76 (arguing that critics of insider trading
exaggerate its supposedly perverse incentives).
5
See infra Part I (summarizing the general arguments made by those who support
insider trading).
6
See infra Part II.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See infra Part III.
9
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 598 ("In short, the federal insider trading
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I. THE CASE FOR INSIDER TRADING
Proponents of insider trading cite its ability to generate substantial
benefits without causing substantial damage.11 The primary alleged
benefit is that, in some situations, insider trading profits are the best way
to compensate executives and induce innovation.12 Henry Manne
initiated this argument.13
[A]n entrepreneur's contribution to the firm consists of
producing new valuable information. The entrepreneur's
compensation must have a reasonable relation to the value
of his contribution to give him incentives to produce more
information. Because it is rarely possible to ascertain
information's value to the firm in advance, predetermined
compensation, such as salary, is inappropriate for
entrepreneurs. Instead, claimed Manne, insider trading is an
effective way to compensate entrepreneurs for innovations.14
This is not what happens now.15 Today, employees who have not
created the valuable information conduct most insider trading.16 The use
of insider trading as a reward for innovation would require each public
company to designate who would be allowed to make such trades, and

prohibition is justifiable solely as a means of protecting rights in information.").
10
See infra Part VI.
11
MANNE, supra note 1, at 154-56 (describing variables that influence the market,
irrespective of whether trades are executed via inside knowledge).
12
See id. at 155 ("Therefore, the additional compensation provided by insider trading
[to executives]…also benefits the corporation.").
13
See id. at 155.
14
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 590. See also id. at 604 ("The only plausible
justification . . . is the argument that legalized insider trading would be an appropriate
compensation scheme.").
15
See Robert A. Prentice & Dain C. Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device,
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2010) (describing how the promotion of insider trading is a problematic
idea and therefore policy choice).
16
See id.; SEC v. Maxwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (S.D. Ohio 2004); SEC v.
Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 761-63 (W.D. Okla. 1984); see also John P. Anderson, Greed,
Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading 30 (Miss. Coll. Sch. of Law Research, Paper
No. 2012-03, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148688
("[Some trade on inside information is acquired] by shear [sic] luck or by eavesdropping on
the conversation of insiders.").
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when they could occur, to monitor compliance.17 This raises huge
logistical problems.18
The second supposed benefit of insider trading is that it enhances
the accuracy of prices in the stock market.19 Even if this were true, it is
doubtful that it generates much benefit.20 Even in the absence of insider
trading, the market for frequently traded securities is already quite
efficient.21 Any benefit from the additional accuracy caused by insider
trading would probably be trivial.22 More important, insider trading also
impairs the functioning of securities markets.23
As for the alleged detriments of insider trading, its defenders claim
that its scope is constrained by the wealth of individual insiders.24
Accordingly, although the abnormal profits realized by inside traders
must (at the moment) come at the expense of outsiders, the cost to the
latter will be small enough that outsiders will not abandon trading in the
firm's stock.25 Edward Herman—pointing to the widespread public stock
ownership and active trading in the 1920s, when insider trading was not

17

See Prentice & Donelson, supra note 15, at 4-5 (citations omitted) ("[I]nsider trading
cannot be limited to the employee who created the information.").
18
See infra Part V.
19
See WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 19 (3d ed.
2010) ("Increased accuracy of securities prices may also improve capital allocation . . . [and]
may enhance the efficiency of the market by moving prices in the correct direction.").
20
The supposed benefit of accurate securities prices is that they help to direct capital to
the most profitable uses; however, "[r]esource allocation is not directly affected by trades of
existing securities." WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 23.
21
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 115 ("The [efficient capital markets hypothesis] is
widely regarded as one of the most well-established propositions in the social sciences.");
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 246 (9th ed. 2007) ("Above
all, [many economists] believe that financial markets are efficient because they don't allow
investors to earn above-average returns without accepting above average risks."); Ronald J.
Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
549-53 (1984) (speculating about the various reasons for market efficiency).
22
MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 246 (describing numerous factors, not including insider
trading, to which economists attribute market efficiency).
23
See infra Part IV.
24
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
25
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 594 n.23 ("[A]ny gains siphoned off by insiders
with respect to a particular stock are likely to be an immaterial percentage of the gains
contemporaneously earned by the class of investors as a whole."); see also id. at 596 ("In the
absence of a credible investor injury story, it is difficult to see why insider trading should
undermine investor confidence in the integrity of the securities markets."); Anderson, supra
note 16, at 7 ("[M]ost economists now agree that the direct impact of insider trading on
counterparties is either non-existent or indeterminable."); Robert E. Wagner, Gordon Gekko to
the Rescue? Insider Trading as a Tool to Combat Accounting Fraud, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 973,
998-1005 (2011) (arguing that legalized insider trading would not undermine investors'
willingness to trade in the stock markets).
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clearly illegal—argues that insider trading would not deter outsider
trading.26 Stock markets, however, have changed since the 1920s.27
More important, even in the 1920s the legality of insider trading
was far from clear.28 The so-called "majority rule" allowed insider
trading.29 However, this rule was subject to an exception whenever
"special facts" existed.30 "Since there was no meaningful way to
differentiate those cases that involved 'special facts' from those that
didn't, the special-facts exception either ate up the majority rule or made
the rule impossible to administer in a consistent fashion."31 Clearly,
legalizing insider trading would be very different, and have very
different consequences.32
II. THE EFFECT OF OUTSIDE FINANCING ON INSIDER TRADING
If insider trading were simply permitted without any restriction,
insiders would be free to seek outside financing for their trading.33 The
incentive for them to do so is obvious.34 Outsiders already borrow

26

Edward S. Herman, Equity Funding, Inside Information, and the Regulators, 21
UCLA L. REV. 1, 17 (1973) ("Perhaps this form of fraud is not regarded seriously because the
market is so full of arbitrary advantage . . . [and] privilege."). In a similar vein, Stephen
Bainbridge says: "The loss of confidence argument is further undercut by the stock market's
performance since the insider trading scandals of the mid-1980s. The enormous publicity
given those scandals put all investors on notice that insider trading is a common securities
violation." BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 596.
However, Congress then strengthened the laws against insider trading and the SEC
stepped up enforcement actions against inside traders. See Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) ("[N]onetheless,
additional methods are appropriate to deter and prosecute violations of such rules and
regulations."); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264
(1984) (increasing, inter alia, the penalties associated with insider trading). This may have
reassured investors that insider trading would be substantially mitigated. Moreover, these
scandals occurred at the beginning of a prolonged economic expansion, which probably
overwhelmed any increased investor concerns about insider trading.
27
See infra Part IV.
28
See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIAL 943 (10th ed. 2011).
29
Id.
30
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 433 (1909) (analyzing the facts of the transactions in
question with the goal of determining legality).
31
EISENBERG & COX, supra note 28, at 946.
32
See infra Part IV.
33
See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.9[1], at 794
(4th ed. 2002) ("A large number of securities transactions, especially those by speculative
investors, are entered into by the broker extending credit to the purchaser.").
34
Id.
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money for stock trading "on margin," so, logically, insiders could borrow
in a similar fashion.35
Indeed, insiders would have both the will and the means to borrow
much more heavily than outsiders.36 In an efficient securities market,
few outsiders, if any, can consistently beat the market.37 Even if a
handful of outsiders can regularly outperform the market, lenders cannot
easily identify them.38 Accordingly, lenders must treat borrowers as
"noise" traders who assume all the risks of the market's volatility.39 To
insulate themselves from these risks, lenders must limit the loans they
make, and either monitor the borrower's performance to make a margin
call when the value of the borrower's securities falls near the amount of
the loan, or demand security from a pledge of other assets owned by the
borrower.40
Insiders, however, can consistently beat the market; they already
do.41 Since their trading is less risky than outsider trading, lenders would

35
See HAZEN, supra note 33, at 794 ("[Purchasing] 'on margin' [is where] the broker
advanc[es] part of the purchase price to the customer.").
36
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 19 (describing the limitations insider
trading laws place on resource allocation to such traders).
37
See id. at 26 ("[E]ven the most sophisticated institutions have difficulty
outperforming the stock market averages."); STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD
& JEFFREY F. JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE 353 (6th ed. 2006), quoted in ROBERTA ROMANO,
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 63 (2d ed. 2010) ("The overwhelming evidence . . . is that
mutual funds, on average, do not beat broad-based indices.").
38
See MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 246 ("$100 bills are not lying around for the taking,
either by the professional or the amateur investor.").
39
Noise Trader Definition, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/
noisetrader.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) ("[Noise Trader is] [t]he term used to describe an
investor who makes decisions regarding buy and sell trades without the use of fundamental
data. These investors generally have poor timing, follow trends, and over-react to good and
bad news.").
40
See HAZEN, supra note 33, § 14.9[1], at 795-97 (explaining margin maintenance and
margin calls).
41
See Joseph E. Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141, 1148 (1992)
(noting that even critics agree that insiders are capable of outperforming the market); Dan
Givoly & Dan Palmon, Insider Trading and the Exploitation of Inside Information: Some
Empirical Evidence, 58 J. BUS. 69, 76 (1985) (noting that insiders generate impressive and
abnormal results); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. BUS. 410,
424 (1974) (explaining the results of a study finding that insiders realize significant abnormal
returns); Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Executives' Good Luck in Trading Own Stock, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 28, 2012, at 1 (explaining that statistics show that executives who trade irregularly
perform better in the market than those who trade in an annual pattern).
Of course, insiders can make mistakes. They might, for instance, overestimate the
market's reaction to some development and by their trading push the price farther than the
market deems appropriate after the development is disclosed. However, insiders are better
positioned than outsiders to evaluate new information, and they can be cautious in their
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be willing to lend them more money.42 Furthermore, because their
trading poses little risk, insiders would be more willing to give personal
assets (like their homes) as collateral to secure loans than would prudent
outsiders.43 As a result, borrowing could greatly multiply the trading
capacity of insiders.44
Alternatively, an insider could also obtain equity financing by
forming a company ("insider trading equity fund" or "ITEF") to
implement her trades and inviting investors to buy stock in her fund.
Although it is theoretically possible for outside investors to get equity
financing,45 it would generally be foolish for others to provide such
financing because few, if any, outsiders can consistently beat the
market.46 Any investor can guess, so giving money to another investor
who is also guessing does not generate better returns.47 Mutual funds
offer investors an easy way to obtain and maintain diversification, and
they handle the paperwork that investors would otherwise have to do
themselves,48 but they do not outperform the market.49
Since insiders will often outperform the market, they could offer
investors better returns than are otherwise available to them.50 As such,
insiders should be able to raise as much equity financing as they could
profitably deploy, but in reality such equity financing is unnecessary.
Entrepreneurs typically issue equity only when an investment is risky;51
trading, so such mistakes should be rare. See Roland Benabou & Guy Laroque, Using
Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility, 107 Q.J.
ECON. 921, 924 (1992).
42
See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that there is less uncertainty and risk
associated with insider trading because when insiders purchase shares, the value of all shares
rise).
43
Id.
44
To secure loans ready when needed, insiders could arrange lines of credit in advance
with lenders. Insiders could also trade on options, which are much cheaper than the
underlying stock, thereby further leveraging their trading capacity. See EISENBERG & COX,
supra note 28, at 777.
45
See Mark A. Allebach, Small Business, Equity Financing, and the Internet: The
Evolution of a Solution?, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 21-31 (1999) (describing desirable conditions
to obtain equity financing without explicitly excluding outside investors).
46
See MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 210 ("[A]ll investors . . . are risk-averse."); supra
note 36 and accompanying text.
47
See MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 204 ("Your guess is as good as that of the ape, your
stockbroker, or even mine.").
48
Id. at 372 ("In addition to offering risk reduction through diversification, the mutual
funds provide freedom from having to select stocks, and relief from paperwork and recordkeeping for tax purposes.").
49
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
50
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
51
See, e.g., Hunter C. Blum, ESOP's Fables: Leveraged ESOPs and Their Effect on
Managerial Slack, Employee Risk and Motivation in the Public Corporation, 31 U. RICH. L.
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debt is preferred for safer investments because it is cheaper.52 Because
insiders take little risk,53 they arguably would be able to raise most or all
the capital they can profitably use by borrowing.54
Does this projection underestimate the risks insiders may incur?
The efficiency and rationality of stock markets have been questioned.55
Limits to arbitrage may restrict the ability of traders to correct
mispricing, so bubbles may persist.56 The activity of uninformed (or
"noise") traders may not be random and independent but may be herdlike behavior.57 More generally, it is unclear how "rational" (or
fundamental value efficient) stock markets are.58
It is hard to see, however, how these market defects pose much
risk to inside traders, who typically trade on the basis of information that
is expected to be publicly disclosed shortly after being attained by these
inside traders.59 Regardless of the possible market flaws just listed, it is
widely accepted that markets react quickly—and appropriately—to the
REV. 1539, 1545 (1997) ("[S]hareholders seek higher returns from equity than debt because
their risk levels are higher.").
52
See WILLIAM R. LASHER, PRACTICAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 560
(2011) ("Generally the return on an equity investment is higher than the return on debt or
preferred because the risk is higher. Hence, the firm's cost of equity capital is higher than its
cost of debt or preferred stock. The return/cost of debt tends to be the lowest of the three,
because debt is the least risky investment.").
53
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
54
To the extent that equity funding was desirable, the funds would probably be private,
because public offerings of stock are much more costly than private placements, and public
investment companies are subject to extensive regulation. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at
87 ("[A] registered public offering is a very expensive proposition . . . [and] public offering
easily can take months to complete.").
55
See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 138-39 (2d ed. 1995) (presenting evidence that stock markets are
not fundamentally value efficient).
56
See ROMANO, supra note 37, at 63-64 (explaining that limits to arbitrage may make
it difficult to correct mispricing); see also MALKIEL, supra note 21, at 234, as reprinted in
ROMANO, supra note 37, at 79-80 ("Arbitrageurs . . . are expected to take offsetting
positions . . . so that any mispricing caused by irrational investors is quickly corrected.").
57
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral
Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2000) (explaining that herd behavior is not random and
occurs when an uninformed actor chooses to follow the decisions of a presumably better
informed person).
58
See ROMANO, supra note 37, at 85 ("[W]hether stocks are correctly valued . . . is
impossible to measure."); see also GILSON & BLACK, supra note 55, at 138-39 (presenting
evidence that stock markets are not fundamentally value efficient).
59
Trading on the belief that a bubble exists would entail greater risks. However,
insiders seem not to trade (at least not aggressively) on such beliefs. There is no evidence that
insiders massively bailed out (much less made extensive short sales) during the high tech and
housing market bubbles. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets
Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 494 (2006) (discussing concerns pursuant to
trading when bubbles exist).
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release of news.60 Theoretically, an insider buying (or selling) a stock
based on non-public (either good or bad) news could get burned if a herd
of irrational noise traders happened to send the stock's price down (or
up), despite disclosure of the good (or bad) news.61 Such incidents,
however, must be extremely rare; I have not noticed reference to any
such cases in the voluminous literature on insider trading. At most,
market irrationality might somewhat limit the ability of insiders to
borrow for trading, thus forcing them to raise a little more outside
equity.62
Alternatively, insiders could sell their information.63
An
investment company could create a public "Tippee Trading Fund," and
pay insiders for information on which the fund would then trade.64 This
would save insiders the time and expense of trading through their own
accounts.65
Could this situation be avoided by allowing insider trading, but
limiting it to the insider's personal funds?66 Minimally, such a limitation
would radically change the standards for executive hiring and retention.
A more wealthy person could reap larger returns from insider trading
than an individual with less personal capital, and therefore would need
fewer alternate forms of compensation.67
Indeed, some wealthy
individuals might offer to pay a company for the privilege to engage in
60

See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 114 (explaining that professional investors react to
new information by trading, and this moves stock prices in response to the change of
information).
61
See, e.g., Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and
Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1286 (2012) ("Noise trading increases . . . the
risk that informed traders will lose money on arbitrage transactions.").
62
See Margaret Bogenrief, A Tale of Two Lending Markets, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Apr.
20, 2011 (asserting that lending institutions are most interested in lending to profitable
companies with the least amount of risk).
63
See Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76
VA. L. REV. 1023, 1052 (1990) (addressing the possibility of an insider selling his inside
information).
64
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 564 (discussing circumstances under which the
court will not find the tippee liable).
65
Roberta Romano provocatively asks: "Could insiders profit by becoming market
makers themselves and offering a lower spread?" ROMANO, supra note 37, at 665.
Without taking that step insiders could still contract to tip market makers, whose
positions may enable them to exploit inside information more cheaply than anyone else can.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
66
See Benjamin Alaire, Dividend Entitlements and Intermediate Default Rules, 9
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 135, 170 (2004) (describing circumstances under which insiders could
use personal funds to trade on nonpublic material).
67
Id. at 170-71 (discussing the potential for insiders to earn virtually unlimited returns
with enough funding).
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insider trading of its stock.68 An individual's managerial ability would
still be a crucial factor, but among several talented managerial
candidates, the lower salary demands of wealthier executives could be
decisive.69
The fairness of such a limitation would be questionable, as it
would allow wealthier executives to reap greater profits than the less
wealthy.70 Such a limitation would also be challenging to enforce and
even to define.71 Trading on public markets is at least observable, but
private financing is not.72 How would the SEC or anyone else know
whether an insider had borrowed money (e.g., from a friend or relative)
with which to trade? How could one say whether an insider was using a
home mortgage loan for purposes of insider trading? Insiders could also
easily avoid the personal-wealth limitation by selling their inside
information to tippees unless that behavior was also forbidden.73
To avoid these problems, the law could simply limit the amount of
insider trading. Establishing and enforcing appropriate limits, however,
would be difficult.74 Even limited opportunities for insider trading would
affect managerial conduct, as discussed in the next section.75 Moreover,
it is unnecessary to incur these problems because any beneficial
incentives created by allowing limited insider trading can be better
achieved through other forms of incentive compensation.76

68
Id. (noting the advantage that insiders have in the market over outsiders, attributable
to their possession of nonpublic information).
69
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70
Id.
71
See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing
the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 449 (2001) (discussing
means by which insiders could evade limitations on insider trading).
72
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 868 (explaining that insider trading is
observable on the market).
73
See Krawiec, supra note 71, at 499 ("Many insiders will . . . evade the . . . limitations
on insider trading by trading through or tipping friends and family members.").
74
Inter alia, it would be difficult to choose the criteria for the permitted amount of
insider trading for each company. How would the amounts be set for each officer? For
instance, what would be the optimal level of permissible insider trading by directors? Would
insider trading allowances be tradable? See id. at 448.
75
See infra Part III.
76
See Kristoffel R. Grechenig, The Marginal Incentive of Insider Trading: An
Economic Reinterpretation of the Case Law, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 75, 123 (2006) (discussing
compensation packages that are not based on insider trading).
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III. THE IMPACT OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Prior commentators have noted that the temptation of insider
trading could drastically alter an executive's management
decisions.77 This is most obvious with respect to disclosure.78 Consider a
CEO who has just received some good news and some bad news, the two
of equal significance. She could disclose both simultaneously, and the
company's stock price would not move. There would be then no
occasion for insider trading.
Alternatively, she could disclose the two items separately. She
could first sell some stock (and/or make short sales), then disclose the
bad news. After the stock's price falls in response, she would buy stock
at the lower price. She would then release the good news and profit
when the stock price reacts by rising. Of course, her gains would be
matched by the losses of outsiders, who would have lost nothing if both
news items had been revealed simultaneously.
Other effects on management are less obvious, but more serious.
For example, each insider would have an incentive to withhold
information from colleagues and the board of directors until she could
fully exploit the insider trading potential of that information.79 Such
behavior could impair management's ability to make good decisions.80
Insiders would also have an incentive to release false or
misleading information to take advantage of the duped outsiders by
trading against them.81 Releasing materially false or misleading
statements violates federal securities laws, and presumably would
continue to do so after the legalization of insider trading,82 but liability

77

See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 599-600 (describing the incentive of
withholding information that insiders would realize, if insider trading were permitted).
78
Id.
79
See id. (discussing how permissive insider trading would promote deliberate
withholding of information); Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1054-56 (1982) (explaining
various scenarios in which the employee might be tempted to withhold information from the
rest of the company).
80
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
81
Haft, supra note 79, at 1055 ("[P]rofit-maximizing insiders, before transmitting
information upward, might attempt to arrange loans to purchase or sell a greater amount of
stock than their available resources would otherwise permit. Insiders might also convey the
information to select corporate outsiders to whom they owe favors or from whom they expect
future benefits.").
82
See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2299 (2011) (opining over whether a mutual fund investment advisor was liable for a 10b-5
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for this behavior has many conditions, and violations are often hard to
prove.83 Currently, occasions when insiders can benefit personally from
issuing false statements are relatively rare because trading on inside
information is illegal.84 By greatly increasing the frequency of such
occasions, the legalization of insider trading would substantially increase
the dissemination of false or misleading information.85
Officers would also have an incentive to run a company so as to
increase the volatility of its stock by increasing risk, even if the steps
taken diminish the company's value.86 There is little potential for insider
trading profit in a stock that does not often rise or fall.87 A stock that is
volatile has greater insider trading opportunities than in one that is
stable.88 Indeed, managers could profit by short selling a company's
stock, and then deliberately making bad decisions that cause its stock
price to plummet.89

violation, pursuant to the dissemination of false information).
83
See, e.g., id. at 2301-02 (recognizing, inter alia, liability under SEC rule 10b-5 is
limited to the person who makes the public statement; it does not extend to one who provided
false information to the speaker); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976)
(finding the plaintiff must prove that the speaker was not merely negligent but knew that the
statement was false).
84
See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. Thus, an insider who traded after the release of
materially false information would violate the securities laws if she knew the information was
false or had any other material nonpublic information, even if she did not make the false
statement.
85
See Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 336 (1981) ("It is not possible for the
firm's stock to trade at the optimal level while the firm keeps its information hidden; better for
the firm to release the information itself at the appropriate time.").
86
See id. at 332; Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with
Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 425 n.18 (2000) ("The prospect of insider
trading profits can [,inter alia,] discourage managerial effort by enabling insiders to profit
even if they generate bad news.").
87
See Saul Levmore, In Defense of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 101, 104-05 (1988) ("But if we assume for the sake of argument, as proponents of
deregulation must, that insider trading is a stimulant that cannot be equaled by compensation
tools that are currently legal, then it follows that insider trading is also dangerous, because the
profit potential from a drop in security prices can motivate poor work or behavior by insiders
that is disastrous to the interests of the firm.").
88
See Easterbrook, supra note 85, at 332 ("The opportunity to gain from insider trading
also may induce managers to increase the volatility of the firm's stock prices. They may select
riskier projects than the shareholders would prefer, because if the risk pays off they can
capture a portion of the gains in insider trading, and, if the project flops, the shareholders bear
the loss.").
89
See Levmore, supra note 87, at 104-05 ("[A]n insider will actually cause a loss so
that a price decrease that he can profit from will occur.").
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The principal defense of insider trading is that it is an efficient
form of executive compensation.90 All the foregoing considerations cast
doubt on that defense.
IV. THE IMPACT OF LEGAL INSIDER TRADING ON STOCK MARKETS
In most cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify specific
victims of insider trading.91 It does not, however, follow that insider
trading is benign.92 To analogize, offenses such as polluting the
environment or failing to pay one's taxes have nameless victims, yet the
existence of harm is clear; so it is with insider trading.93
Even proponents of insider trading acknowledge that it causes
greater disparities between bid and ask prices.94 Further, the SEC has
said that "economic studies have provided support for the view that
insider trading reduces liquidity, increases volatility, and may increase
the cost of capital."95 Thus, insider trading impairs more than it enhances
the efficient functioning of stock markets, even when it is illegal, and
therefore not very common.96
Scholars claim that widespread insider trading did not prevent
rapid growth of the stock market in the 1920s.97 However, even at the
time, insider trading was not clearly legal.98 Moreover, both stock
ownership and trading are much greater now than they were in the
1920s.99

90

See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25, infra note 176.
92
See Levmore, supra note 87, at 105 (describing various forms of malfeasance the
spectre of insider trading can bring to a going concern).
93
Id. ("[D]eregulation threatens the economy with less information and with
strategically bad behavior by insiders. These arguments, and the evolution toward regulation
of insider trading in so many legal systems, create a strong presumption that must be overcome
by those who would deregulate.”).
94
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 37 ("[S]pecialists and market-makers
may be the victims of stock market insider trading (although they may sometimes pass the
harm to others)."); Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 144-45 (2004)
(discussing the pros and cons of increased regulation on insider trading). However, some
studies show no correlation. See id at 147-48.
95
Exchange Act Release No. 43154, 73 SEC Docket 3, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 86, 319 (Aug. 15, 2000).
96
Id.
97
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
98
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
99
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 860 n.16 (describing historical international
trends in insider trading regulation).
91
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The ban on insider trading probably has something to do with
this:
Stock traders are more sophisticated now than in the 1920s.101
Most traders then were individuals, many of whom were buying stock for
the first time and knew little of the risks, including insider trading, until
they were rudely educated by the 1929 stock market crash.102 Today,
most trading is done by institutions that are keenly aware of such risks.103
Furthermore, in the 1920s, no foreign stock markets barred insider
trading, so investors had no better alternative than the American
markets.104 Today, all developed countries ban insider trading.105 If
America were to legalize insider trading, investors would simply go
elsewhere.106
Legalizing insider trading could effectively destroy public stock
markets.107 Defenders of insider trading claim that it does not harm
outsiders.108 Although it is virtually impossible to identify the victims of
any particular act of insider trading, it is easy to see that it must hurt
outside investors collectively.109
Imagine two publicly traded companies with identical operations.
In one there is some significant amount of insider trading; in the other
there is none. In the former, insiders siphon off some of the profits from
the stock. Accordingly, outsiders must value its stock lower than the
stock of the latter company.110 Nonetheless, as long as the level of insider
100

100

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An
Introduction to the Insider Trading Research Handbook 35-36 (UCLA School of Law, Law &
Econs. Research, Paper No. 12-15 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141457
(describing the expansion of trading volume in recent years).
101
See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 676 (1997) (discussing how the SEC
passed Rule 14e-3(a) to prevent sophisticated traders from trading on the basis of material,
nonpublic information, and then escaping responsibility due to lack of proof).
102
See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 526 (1909) (describing fraud in a pre1929 market).
103
See Bainbridge, supra note 100, at 14 (describing the development of Exchange
Act §§ 16(b) and 10(b)).
104
Id. at 21.
105
See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
106
Id.
107
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) ("Investors likely would
hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading was based on misappropriated
nonpublic information unchecked by law."). If that statement is true, it would seem also to
apply a fortiori to trading by insiders of the issuer.
108
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
109
See Wagner, supra note 25, at 999 ("[I]n the most recent insider trading Supreme
Court case, United States v. O'Hagan, 'there is no mention of individual harm in specific
transactions. Rather, the focus is on the harm from a decrease in public confidence in the
market.'").
110
See Morris Mendelson, The Mechanics of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U.
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trading stays low, the potential profits to outsiders are still high enough
to attract them to purchase the stock at some price.111
This all changes once insider trading is permitted, as it is hard to
see how there could be any other trading.112 Insiders will trade whenever
no higher returns are attainable from other investments (e.g., real
estate).113 Imagine being asked to bid on a bag whose contents you do
not know, but that are known to another bidder. The informed bidder
will raise her bid unless and until you bid more than the bag's fair value.
No reasonable person would enter such a contest.114
It is suggested that insider trading will not scare off outsiders
because they "already disregard a large body of evidence indicating that
even the most sophisticated institutions have difficulty outperforming the
stock market averages. . . . These investors may be convinced that
certain stocks will make them money; the occurrence of insider trading
may have little effect on investment so motivated."115 Not all
"uninformed" traders, however, are so naive.116 Even investors familiar
with the efficient market hypothesis buy and sell stock when they want to
make additional investments, disinvest, or better diversify their
portfolios.117
As already noted, the public market in a stock can survive some
level of insider trading.118 To compensate for the gains siphoned off by
PA. L. REV. 470, 477-78 (1969) (book review) (discussing insider trading as a mechanism of
relative devaluation); William K. S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators
and Remedies-Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic Defect,
28 VILL. L. REV. 27, 29 (2000) (noting that if insiders make more profit, other investors must
make less); see also Obeua S. Persons, SEC's Insider Trading Enforcements and Target Firms,
39 J. BUS. RES. 187, 189 (July 1997) (asserting that an announcement of insider trading
enforcement action by the SEC is associated with a price decrease in the affected stock).
111
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 52-54 (describing how low volume
securities may escape apparent damage from the presence of insider trading).
112
See JASON KELLY, THE NEATEST LITTLE GUIDE TO STOCK MARKET INVESTING 23 (2010) (emphasizing the importance of stock trading).
113
Id.
114
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (explaining that such a situation is a variation
on a market for lemons. That is, uninformed outsider buyers must assume that the seller is an
insider with undisclosed bad news and, accordingly, discount the price they are willing to pay.
With the market price so depressed, insiders will not sell unless they do have undisclosed bad
news.).
115
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 26.
116
See Mendelson, supra note 110, at 475 (asserting that it is a fallacy to assume that
only certain types of investors are risk-averse).
117
See Easterbrook, supra note 85, at 336 ("People invest in stock because they
anticipate return.").
118
See Wagner, supra note 25, at 1001 ("[E]ven though the most widespread insider
trading scandal in the history of Wall Street had just been revealed and was still being reported
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insiders, the market will discount a stock's price to allow rational trading
by outsiders.119 In an efficient market, uninformed investors cannot beat
the market, but neither will they underperform other outsiders, "even the
most sophisticated institutions."120 They will invest in stocks if the stock
market outperforms other available investments.121 In the long run, it
does.122
If insider trading becomes rampant, however, the only trades left
on the table for outsiders will be those that insiders have spurned because
they offer a lower return than is available elsewhere.123 Not even the
most sophisticated mutual fund could match the performance of even a
minimally skilled insider. In such a world only a fool would utilize
anything but an insider trading equity fund to trade stock.124
Not even through examining foreign experience can we adequately
tell how stock markets would fare under legalized insider trading because
"all countries with developed capital markets limit insider trading to
some extent."125 However, the breadth and enforcement of the
prohibitions vary, and stricter insider trading bans are associated with
wider stock ownership, better stock price accuracy, and deeper market
liquidity.126 The corporate cost of equity declines significantly when a
country forbids insider trading and actually enforces the law.127
on, the stock market value increased by almost 25%.").
119
Investors who trade in a futile effort to beat the market are still irrationally incurring
the transaction costs of trading, but these are not very large.
120
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 26.
121
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 881 (arguing that even if this means that
insider trading at low levels will not injure outsiders, it does not follow that low levels of
insider trading are not inefficient).
122
See KELLY, supra note 112, at 2-3 (documenting that returns in the stock market
have exceeded returns to other investments over the past 75 years).
123
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 27 ("This delay would extend the period
during which public traders incur beneficial windfalls or fortuitous losses.").
124
Curiously, some commentators acknowledge this fact but fail to draw the inevitable
conclusions. Bainbridge, supra note 100, at 35-36 ("When trading with insiders, the market
maker or specialist . . . will always be on the wrong side of the transaction."). However, he
stops there, failing to realize that legalizing insider trading would therefore force even
sophisticated players like specialists out of the stock markets, thereby devastating if not
completely destroying them. Rather, he treats the ban on insider trading as a form of rents for
specialists and market professionals. See id. at 35-37.
125
Bainbridge, supra note 100, at 21.
126
See Laura N. Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An
Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237,
258-59, 261-62, 273-80 (2007) (highlighting the types of insider trading enforcement
provisions that are found internationally).
127
See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J.
FIN. 75, 104 (2002) ("[T]he establishment of insider trading laws–is not associated with a
reduction in the cost of equity. It is the difficult part–the enforcement of insider trading laws–
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Countries that more effectively bar insider trading have less volatile
stock markets.128 So it is no surprise that whenever the SEC announces
enforcement actions involving insider trading, the price of the affected
stock declines.129
All this evidence contradicts the market efficiency arguments for
insider trading. Although less of the pie remains for outsiders if more of
it is taken by inside traders, outsiders might still be better off if insider
trading spurs innovation, thereby causing the pie to expand.130 In that
case however, companies in markets that allow insider trading should
have a lower cost of capital, and revelations of possible insider trading in
a company's stock should cause its stock price to rise.131 The evidence
just discussed demonstrates that the opposite is true.
Outsiders might be able to share in superior profits by investing in
insider trading equity funds. However, as already suggested, insiders
will probably have little need to create such funds because they will be
able to finance most or all of their trading with (cheaper) debt.132 Thus,
everyone but insiders would abandon the stock market.133
As an obvious consequence, public trading in stocks would
essentially cease.134 Insiders can trade only if there are outsiders
(including market makers)135 with whom to trade. If outsiders pull out,
that is associated with a reduction in the cost of equity in a country."); Robert A. Prentice, The
Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 831 n.347 (2006) (asserting that this
phenomenon conforms to theoretical predictions); see also Mendelson, supra note 110, at 47778 (positing that companies with insider trading would have a higher cost of capital than
companies without it).
128
See Julan Du & Shang-Jin Wei, Does Insider Trading Raise Market Volatility?, 114
ECON. J. 916, 940 (2004). A recent study concludes that "more democratic political systems
enacted and enforced insider trading laws earlier than less democratic or authoritarian political
systems, controlling for wealth, financial development, legal origin, etc." Laura N. Beny, The
Political Economy of Insider Trading Laws and Enforcement: Law vs. Politics? International
Evidence 44 (U. of Mich. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 08-001, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=304383.
129
See Persons, supra note 110, at 188-89 ("The negative effects of these SECs
enforcement's [sic] can be attributable to noncompliance with the securities laws of target
firms. Because insider trading enforcement also involves the noncompliance with the
securities laws, the enforcement is likely to have a negative effect on a target firm's stock
value.").
130
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 881 n.80 (arguing that permitting insider
trading would expand the pie).
131
Id.
132
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
133
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 879 ("In order to induce trade [of stocks],
something must prevent the uninformed from holding the 'market' and not trading.").
134
Id.
135
WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 67 n.84 ("[M]arket-makers are
disproportionately harmed by insider trading [and, accordingly,] market-makers' bid-ask
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there would be no stock market; there would be no publicly traded
companies.136
It would not, however, be tenable to have all the equity of large
firms owned by just a few insiders; that is why public ownership
originally evolved. If public ownership were destroyed by insider
trading, large firms would have to seek investment from private equity
companies.137 In most cases, private equity owners demand control.138 As
part of that control, they also insist on full disclosure when executives
buy or sell the firm's stock.139 In other words, they do not tolerate insider
trading. Thus, ironically, legalizing insider trading would lead to the
extinction of public stock markets and of insider trading itself.
Although unrestricted insider trading would destroy the stock
markets and thus preclude insider trading, could market forces somehow
react so as to prevent this destruction? It is true that individual insiders
would have no incentive to restrain their trading,140 but, as a response,
individual companies could try to curb insider trading.141
V. CAN THE MARKET HANDLE INSIDER TRADING?
Public stock ownership evolved because it is efficient in many
situations. The disappearance of public ownership posited in the
preceding section would be inefficient, but markets tend to be efficient.142
spreads are wider for firms with a great deal of insider trading."). See also MANNE, supra note
1, at 102 (arguing that frequent traders are more likely to be harmed by insider trading than
long-term investors). If insider trading were legalized and became widespread, marketmakers would probably have to cease doing business.
136
Is this fear exaggerated? It has been pointed out that until recent legislation,
government officials could trade on misappropriated nonpublic information, but this did not
destroy the stock markets. However, even before the recent legislation, the legality of such
trading was unclear. Compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36
J. CORP. L. 281, 285 (2011) ("[C]ongressional staffers and other government officials and
employees could be prosecuted successfully for insider trading under the federal securities
laws, but the quirks of the relevant laws almost certainly would prevent members of Congress
from being successfully prosecuted."), with Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional
Officials, and Duties of Enforcement, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1142-43, 1147 (2011) (arguing to
the contrary that politicians are also subject to political pressures against such behavior to
which business executives are not exposed. As a result, the level of such misappropriation
trading by government officials has been too low to destroy the stock markets.).
137
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
138
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
139
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
140
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
141
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 862-63 (stating that there has been little to
no consideration regarding private regulation of insider trading).
142
See Beny, supra note 128, at 2 ("Despite theoretical arguments that stock markets
are more efficient when insiders are allowed to trade freely, many increasingly regard insider
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Why, then, could the market itself not preserve public ownership to the
extent that it is efficient? Insider trading apologists argue that
corporations could have prohibited insider trading long ago, but they did
not do so.143 These apologists infer that such a prohibition would be
inefficient.144
However, in the last thirty years, many corporations have adopted
insider trading prohibitions.145 Moreover, prior to that time many
corporations did not even expressly prohibit embezzlement.146 This does
not mean these corporations condoned embezzlement. Rather, they
probably believed that any employee caught stealing would be fired and
become unemployable, and that any further sanction would be imposed
by public law.147 The same reasoning probably applied to insider
trading.148 Although many firms in the past (and some still today) do not
formally forbid insider trading, never did any firms in the past publicly
condone insider trading, and none have sought exemptions from the laws
against insider trading.149
Thomas Lambert proposes that corporations be allowed to opt out
of insider trading laws, so long as insiders disclose their identities and
the fact of their trading at the time of their trades.150 This arrangement
would cause serious uncertainty whenever such an insider traded.151
Insiders may trade not to exploit non-public information, but simply
because they need cash or have extra cash that they want to invest.
trading as a threat to stock market integrity and efficiency.").
143
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 864 (discussing the issues surrounding the
prospect of company-based contractual limitations on insider trading).
144
Id. at 863-64.
145
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, at 35. One reason for the change may be
"the enhanced pressure from congressional legislation enacted in the 1980s." Id. See also J.
C. Bettis, J. L. Coles & M.L. Lemmon, Corporate Policies Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57
J. FIN. ECON. 191, 192 (2000) (arguing that even though research focuses on federal
regulations, internal regulations are also widespread).
146
See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 19, § 2.3.2, at 35 (describing how passive
companies were about employees using their respective positions for personal gain).
147
Corporations cannot impose fines or criminal penalties; only public law can do that.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in PRINCIPALS AND
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 81, 94 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
A company prohibition on insider trading would also be difficult to draft and enforce,
even if the firm were fully aware of the insiders' conduct. The law of insider trading is
complex with respect to issues like materiality and scienter. See supra note 82. It would be
difficult for a firm to draft a policy covering all these issues.
148
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 858-59, 894.
149
See id. at 864.
150
Thomas A. Lambert, Decision Theory and the Case for a Disclosure-Based Insider
Trading Regime 14 (U. Mo. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-18, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2082521.
151
Id. at 18.
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Unable to determine the insider's reasons, outsiders and market makers
could only guess and adjust the stock's price accordingly.152
Insiders could counter erroneous inferences by denying that they
were exploiting inside information. When insiders who were using nonpublic information traded, then, what would happen?153 If the market
overreacted, could the insider withdraw her trading order? An order
would be executed, then, only if the market underreacted. In that case,
outsiders and market makers could protect themselves only by ceasing to
trade until the insider either withdrew her order or disclosed the nonpublic information. In other words, the markets would temporarily cease
to function.154
Another problem with letting each company set its own rules is
that the stock of any company refusing to impose an effective ban on
insider trading would fall in value.155 Shareholders of such a company
would have a legitimate complaint that they should not have to bear the
resulting losses,156 particularly because the directors deciding to allow
insider trading would be among the potential beneficiaries of that policy,
making their decision self-interested.157
More importantly, although individual companies could forbid
insider trading, this would not be as effective as a public ban. At the
least, it would substitute thousands of company-specific rules against
insider trading for the current uniform rule. Recall that the primary
supposed benefit of insider trading is its efficiency with regards to
rewarding corporate innovators.158 To make the incentives effective
requires a determination of which insiders were permitted to trade on
each bit of inside information.159 One problem of implementation would

152
Id. (stating that requiring trading reports could result in the filing of reports even
when insiders are trading on the basis of nonpublic information).
153
Id. (proposing that to prevent such happenings, a "wolf crying" regulation be
established).
154
Lambert, supra note 150, at 18-19.
155
See Mendelson, supra note 110, at 477-78; Persons, supra note 110, at 187; Wang,
supra note 110, at 29-30.
156
Some commentators view inside information as property owned by the corporation.
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 599, 604. However, that property now belongs, in effect, to
the shareholders, for whom the directors are fiduciaries. It therefore seems inappropriate that
the board approve a change in policy that would shift value from the shareholders to corporate
insiders without compensation. Of course, if a company announced that it permits insider
trading before it went public, public investors would then be on notice and could not complain
that they were being fleeced. Id. at 605-06.
157
See Persons, supra note 110, at 189.
158
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
159
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 599-600.
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be that the determination would have to be made by corporate officials
after the information was disclosed to them.160 This would entail, inter
alia, substantial delay and the possibility of leakage of the information.161
Furthermore, it is rare that an innovation can be ascribed entirely
to one person.162 Sorting out who contributed to every innovation will
usually be difficult, and often contentious. "Victory has a hundred
fathers, but defeat is an orphan."163 The company would have either to let
all contributors trade or allot individual rations to each contributor. The
former approach raises the possibility that minor players would reap as
much or more profit than the main innovators, which would severely
erode the effectiveness of the program in rewarding innovation.164 In the
latter approach, the resulting complexity and potential for resentment
seem overwhelming.165
A particularly important question becomes the insider trading
rights of the directors themselves. At least in theory, the board is the
corporation's supreme governing body.166 Presumably, then, a good
board adds corporate value. If it does not, should the directors resign?
On the other hand, recognizing that the board does not participate in
operations, would employees resent the profits reaped by directors (who
typically meet only one day per month) from knowledge generated by
the employees? There seems to be no satisfactory solution to this
dilemma.
The inevitable logistical difficulties of allocating insider trading
rights also evidence the conceptual problem with using insider trading as
compensation. If a board can identify the contribution of each employee
to an innovation, it can better reward that employee directly rather than
through the allocation of insider trading rights. One argument for insider
trading is that "it allows a manager to alter his compensation package in

160

Id.
Id. See also Haft, supra note 79, at 1062-63.
162
See Haft, supra note 79, at 1062-63.
163
Count Galeazzo Ciano, THE OXFORD BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 203 (Angela
Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992).
164
Manne conceded that many employees could trade on inside information without
having contributed at all to any innovation. MANNE, supra note 1, at 173.
165
Robert Haft envisions damage to firm morale as lower level employees "recognize
that each succeeding level upward possesses greater financial resources and over-all
knowledge of corporate activities than the last." Haft, supra note 37, at 1057. The
resentment would be even greater for those who felt that their contribution to innovation had
not been properly recognized.
166
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.").
161
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light of new knowledge, thereby avoiding continual renegotiation [of his
incentive compensation package]. The manager, in effect, 'renegotiates'
each time he trades."167 In other words, the argument for insider trading
assumes that a board cannot apportion credit for innovation.168
If that is true, though, the board also cannot make detailed
allotments of insider trading rights.169 It can only permit insider trading
by all employees, or by a designated class of "innovators."170 Under the
former approach true innovators will try to hide their innovations from
colleagues, so as to preserve the insider trading opportunities for
themselves, thereby constricting the free flow of information needed for
efficient operations.171 Nonetheless, it is virtually impossible to pursue
an innovation without other employees learning about it, so inevitably,
much of the insider trading profits will be reaped by others.172
If instead a board limits insider trading to a designated group of
"innovators," it will provoke tremendous resentment among excluded
employees whose jobs have been tacitly labeled routine or ministerial, or
not the kind of work that can add value.173 Those in the honored group,
though, would be free to profit from inside information that has nothing
to do with innovation, such as an unexpectedly good or bad earnings
report.174 They would also be approved to reap insider trading profits
even when they contributed nothing to an innovation.175 Thus, true
innovators will still be motivated to hide their innovations.
Equally important would be the provisions for enforcement of
insider trading bans.
Violation of a company rule would not
automatically give rise to shareholder standing to sue. Because it is
impossible, even in theory, to identify particular victims of insider
trading,176 no shareholder could sue directly. It is disputed whether
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insider trading even damages the corporation.177 Operating under the
assumption that it does, only the board can sue for injuries to the
corporation, unless a majority of the directors are so personally interested
in the matter that bringing a lawsuit would entail suing themselves.178
Outsiders would be left to wonder how diligently the board would ferret
out and prosecute inside traders.
Even a board trying to be diligent lacks the monitoring
mechanisms capable of making a difference.179 Insiders can either hide
their trading from management or refrain from trading personally but sell
their information to tippees.180 The SEC and the exchanges can monitor
the stock market for unusual trading.181 Even then, it is difficult to catch
a clever inside trader.182 Without reliable monitoring devices, even a
committed board might not be very effective.183
It would, moreover, be understandable that a sophisticated board
might not want to pursue or punish insider trading too vigorously.184 As
soon as the board starts to proceed against one of its own officers, the
trust between them, that is essential to effective governance, is broken.
And that may be true not only for the executive(s) charged, but for all the
company's officers, since management tends to view itself as a team,
with interests somewhat separate from those of the board. That
possibility is not currently a problem because insider trading is illegal
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and violations can be pursued by the SEC and individual investors; the
board almost always stays hors de combat.185 If insider trading were
legalized, the board could no longer rely on others to move against it.186
In sum, it is hard to see how reliance on the market to deter and to
sanction insider trading could be nearly as effective as the current
(admittedly imperfect) system under federal law.187 At the least, a private
system would leave considerable uncertainty in the trading public. Even
if a company were perceived to be essentially free of insider trading,
substantial changes in management or in the composition of the board
might raise questions about whether substantial insider trading might be
in the offing. Public investors would have to continuously monitor and
price the risk of insider trading in each public company.
Especially for smaller companies, the costs of such an effort would
often exceed the potential returns, so that trading in and public ownership
of these stocks would decline–perhaps to the point where the costs of
public ownership would exceed the benefits for many companies.188
These companies would then go private.
Nonetheless, companies going public should be allowed to opt out
of insider trading prohibitions if they disclose that policy.189 If investors
are warned of the policy, they cannot later complain about it.190
VI. INSIDE INFORMATION AS CORPORATE PROPERTY
Some commentators view insider trading in terms of property
rights to information.191 Some would allocate that property right to
managers.192 This would lead to all the problems with insider trading
already discussed.
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Stephen Bainbridge argues for assigning the property right to the
corporation.193 This argument, however, raises the question: how can a
corporation exploit that right, especially with respect to its own stock?194
Bainbridge never addresses this question.195 If the corporation reassigns
the right to managers, we have all the problems already discussed.196
The corporation could instead trade for its own account. However,
the board of directors (which would have to authorize such trading) owes
fiduciary duties to the shareholders, who would be on the other side of
trades for the firm's own account.197 The law now does not currently
permit this.198 "The issuer itself cannot trade on its own stock based on
material nonpublic information."199
It is hard to see why that rule should be changed. The corporation
itself is a legal fiction, not a real person; it has no interests apart from
those of its constituents.200 In theory, the premier corporate
constituents—those to whom fiduciary duties are owed—are the
shareholders because only shareholders have the proper incentives to
maximize efficiency.201 It would, then, be inconsistent with efficiency for
a corporation to trade against its own shareholders for the benefit of
some other constituency, such as its employees.
Nor would it make economic sense for the firm to trade at the
expense of shareholders trading the other way and for the benefit of nontrading shareholders.202 First, the possibility of such trading creates an
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irreconcilable tension with the corporation's public disclosure policies.203
Corporations are urged not to give the minimum disclosures at the last
possible moment required by law, but to give the fullest and earliest
disclosure of information consistent with the strategic needs of the
business for secrecy.204 A corporation trading for its own account,
however, would have an incentive to disclose as little and as late as
permitted by law, in order to maximize the opportunities for trading
profits from insider information. A general reduction and delay in the
information disclosures by public companies would make securities
markets less efficient.
More important, trading by a corporation in its own stock for the
benefit of one group of shareholders at the expense of another group
violates the principle that the board should not discriminate among
shareholders without good reason.205 Here, no such reason is evident.
All shareholders bought their stock at some time (or received their stock
gratuitously in a chain from someone who did buy), and all shareholders
eventually dispose of their stock. Shareholders who trade often do so
because of personal financial exigencies;206 they are not committing any
wrong for which they deserve to be exploited by the companies in whose
stock they trade.
A rule of "caveat trader" would not benefit investors generally; it
would only disadvantage investors who trade more than investors who
trade less. However, the efficiency of stock markets depends on a steady
flow of trading.207 Insider trading by issuers would discourage trading,
with resultant damage to the efficiency of stock markets208 but no
offsetting benefits to investors.
In sum, it would be a bad idea to treat inside information as
property that belongs to the corporation, able to be exploited in trading
for its own account.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A persistent band of commentators continues to claim that insider
trading is beneficial or, at least, so innocuous that it should be legal.
However, these arguments all presume that the level of insider trading
would remain low even if it were permitted, because it would be limited
by the personal wealth of individual insiders. This Note has shown that
this assumption is unwarranted.
If insider trading were legal, insiders could easily obtain outside
financing to exploit their informational advantage, and they would have
no reason not to do so. This would drive the disadvantaged outsiders
from the stock markets, thereby drastically reducing public ownership of
corporations, which would also effectively end insider trading.
Individual corporations lack the means and the incentives to curb insider
trading on their own. It would also be unwise to treat inside information
as property belonging to the corporation that can be exploited in trading
for its own account. Corporations are supposed to operate for the benefit
of their shareholders, not to fleece them for the benefit of some other
constituency or some subset of shareholders. Accordingly, there is no
plausible argument for legalizing insider trading.

